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Abstract: The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-
interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive 
effect.  The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same 
extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation.  I 
argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is 
the common law process.  
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Perhaps the most optimistic view of the American Law Institute’s Restatement project was 
provided at its inception by Benjamin Cardozo: 
 
When, finally, it goes out under the name and with the sanction of the Institute, 
after all this testing and retesting, it will be something less than a code and 
something more than a treatise. It will be invested with unique authority, not to 
command, but to persuade. It will embody a composite thought and speak a 
composite voice. Universities and bench and bar will have had a part in its 
creation. I have great faith in the power of such a restatement to unify our law.1 
  
I will take a somewhat less optimistic view here.  The incentives of actors in the common law 
process have been examined many times.  Much less has been said about the incentives of actors 
in the Restatement process. 
 
Incentives are always something to worry about, at least from the perspective of the non-
optimist.  Holmes referred to the law as reflecting a concern for the decisions of the “bad man”.2  
The Holmesian bad man is not necessarily bad in the sense of being evil.  He is bad in the sense 
of acting solely for his own advantage, after calculating the private costs and benefits of his 
actions.  Many lawyers have to consult with bad men of this type all of the time.  As much as we 
would like to emphasize ethics and moral standards in the legal academy, lawyers in the real 
world have to provide advice to clients who do not have justice or social welfare at the top of 
their agendas. 
 
The common law process itself could be distorted by the actions of Holmesian bad men.  Judges 
might decide cases out of self-interest, or with a disregard for a certain type of litigant.  The 
common law process, if it is as good as the evidence suggests,3 must have built deep within it 
some shock absorbers to minimize the impact of bad men on its development.  In other words, 
the common law process presumably has checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a 
particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial effect.  This is a question, 
in any event, that I will consider here. 
 
The question that immediately follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the 
same extent as is the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its 
creation.  I will argue that it is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the 
common law process.  Because of this, it is an open question whether the Restatement will unify 
and improve the common law, as Cardozo believed. 
 
The Common Law Process and Social Welfare 
 
The common law has been defended by some impressive legal authorities.  Blackstone 
singlehandedly set out a unified account and defense of the common law, as well as its history 
                                                          
1 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (Yale Univ. Press, 1924). 
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (1897). 
3 See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Paul Mahoney, The Common Law 
and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).  
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and policies.4  Blackstone’s account, which shaped legal education for roughly a century after 
publication, describes the common law as virtually synonymous with reason and holds that any 
unambiguously unreasonable rule should be regarded as not part of the common law – even if a 
court says that it is.5   Blackstone never quite explained what it means for the law to be 
reasonable, but one can infer from his arguments that the common law is reasonable because it is 
based on norms adopted by convention.  Such norms should be reasonable because they reflect 
implicit agreements or conventions that maximize the joint welfare of all interested parties.  
These norms would trade off competing interests in an objective manner, reflecting the choices 
of an impartial spectator.6  Courts could discover these norms in the course of deciding legal 
disputes. 
 
Blackstone’s hazy, almost mystical reverence for reason in the common law generated a vicious 
counterattack by Bentham, who argued that reason could only be understood from the 
perspective of self-interest.7  What is reasonable to me, Bentham argued, is what I think is good.  
The same goes for you.  There is no perspective-neutral argument for believing that something I 
find reasonable would also be reasonable in your eyes.  The common law materializes, then, 
when one of us is able to assert control over the framing of a legal rule.  The one who prevails 
declares the law that suits him to be reasonable, putting an end to disputes over the law. 
 
The notion of reasonableness in the common law would have its next great defender in Holmes.8  
Reasonableness in the law resulted, according to Holmes, from the trading off of competing 
interests in a manner that maximizes social welfare.  Courts sacrifice a dollar of gain to Sam if it 
would result in two dollars of loss to Joe.  The rules that emerged from this utilitarian balancing 
did not necessarily reflect underlying societal norms that courts had discovered.  The rules were 
imposed by courts, as Bentham believed.  The common law process led to disputes, in which the 
appropriate or prevailing norm was unclear, being litigated in court, and re-litigated, until a 
utility-maximizing set of rules was established. 
 
The most recent defense of the common law is the efficiency thesis associated with Posner.9  
Common law rules tend to be economically efficient, in the sense of minimizing social costs.  
Like Holmes, Posner argues that the courts choose these rules without necessarily relying on or 
discovering underlying social norms.  Efficiency differs from the utility maximization process 
envisioned by Holmes in the sense that efficiency takes markets, explicit and implicit, into 
account.  An efficient solution is consistent with one that the market, in its ideal form free of 
transactional barriers and externalities, would generate.  To find the efficient solution, a judge 
need only consult the market, or try to imagine what the market would have provided.  In 
contrast, utility maximization, as stressed by Holmes, does not necessarily attempt to replicate an 
ideal market.  Utility maximization might result in an inefficient outcome that is preferred by a 
faction with intense preferences and control over the law creation process.  However, outside of 
                                                          
4 See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979) 
(1765-1769). 
5 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-70. 
6 See generally BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW (Liberty Fund, 3rd ed. 1991) (1961).  
7 See JEREMY BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1776); see also GERALD J. 
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (Clarendon Press, 1986). 
8 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown and Co. 1881). 
9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Aspen, 8th ed. 2011). 
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this rather special case, the welfare maximization and economic efficiency theses are equivalent 
in terms of their implications for the common law. 
 
The welfare maximization arguments of Holmes and Posner do not provide an explanation for 
how the common law moves toward welfare-maximizing rules.  If the law were controlled 
entirely by one judge, and that judge were committed to inefficient outcomes, presumably the 
law would not be efficient or welfare maximizing.  This suggests that there must be features of 
the common law process that permit reasonable, efficient, or welfare-maximizing rules to evolve 
and to persist. 
 
Paul Rubin offered what is perhaps the most persuasive theory for evolution toward welfare-
maximizing common law rules.10  Rubin argued that inefficient rules would be litigated more 
often than would efficient rules, and because of the greater rate of litigation, inefficient rules 
would be overturned more often than efficient rules.11  The reason inefficient rules would be 
litigated more often is that such rules reduce the joint welfare of long-term stakeholders involved 
in any dispute, relative to an efficient rule.  Given this, the stakeholders would have incentives to 
overturn the rule through litigation.  Alternatively the stakeholders could overturn an inefficient 
rule through private agreement.12 
 
For example, suppose property law gave the right to Richard Roe, a neighbor of John Doe, to cut 
down the old oak tree on John Doe’s property.  In most cases such as this, John Doe would put a 
higher value on keeping the tree than Richard Roe would put on cutting down the tree.  Suppose, 
for example, John Doe values the tree at $4,000; Richard Roe values the absence of the tree at 
$1,000.  If the inefficient rule granting the property right to Richard Roe were overturned, John 
Doe would gain $4,000 and Richard Roe would lose $1,000; their joint gain would be $3.000.  If 
John Doe could sue to overturn the inefficient rule for a relatively small expense, he would do 
so.  Richard Roe would not be willing to invest more than $1,000 in a lawsuit defending his right 
to cut down the tree.  John Doe would be willing to spend up to $4,000 to gain the right of 
control over the tree.  Given these differences in willingness-to-pay, litigation is likely to lead 
eventually to a decision in which the property rule giving the neighbor the right of control over 
the tree is overturned. 
 
In addition to simply challenging inefficient legal rules, litigation also provides information to 
courts.  Each litigant has strong incentives to reveal every fact that could bolster his side of the 
case.  The end result is that a court receives far more information, from parties with direct and 
                                                          
10 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977) (“If rules are inefficient, there 
will be an incentive for the party held liable to force litigation; if rules are efficient, there will be no such 
incentive.”). 
11 For example, suppose the likelihood of a rule being overturned is ten percent.  If inefficient rules are litigated 
more often than efficient rules, then inefficient rules will be overturned more frequently.  For a careful examination 
of this argument, see Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of 
Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980). 
12 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991); 
Keith N. Hylton and Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements, 12 AM. LAW & ECON. 
REV. 181(2010).  More generally, the Coase Theorem, which holds that in the absence of transaction costs parties 
will bargain toward an efficient allocation of resources, implies that rules that inefficient legal rules will be 
overturned through private agreement, when such agreements are feasible.  See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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opposing stakes, than any other regulatory or legislative institution in existence.  As Hayek 
stressed in relation to markets,13 the litigation process induces actors to reveal information that 
they would otherwise keep private.14 
 
The evolutionary arguments discussed so far leave out the role of the law itself.  The common 
law, Blackstone noted, equates legal validity with reasonableness.15  This means that legal 
decisions, in the common law process, have to be justified on the basis of reasonableness.  
Reasonableness typically has been explained in terms of the trade off in competing utilities, 
objectively evaluated, or in terms of the expectations of the parties.  The judges often defend 
their decisions with a view toward their implications for the welfare of parties who are in the 
positions of the litigants.  Those justifications become grounds for subsequent reexaminations of 
the legal rule. 
 
Reasonableness arguments are not infinitely malleable.  There is only so much spin that you can 
put on the reasonableness justification for a court decision.  Return to the example of John Doe 
and Richard Roe.  A court could argue that the inefficient rule should be deemed reasonable by 
asserting, falsely, that most neighbors would put a higher valuation on control over a tree on a 
given piece of property than would the property owner himself.16  But this is an empirical 
proposition that can be tested and proven false.  The common law process allows for such 
empirical propositions to be tested in the litigation process; indeed, the appeals process provides 
a direct test of relative valuations.  The decentralization of the common law process implies that 
empirical propositions will be tested and retested, both formally in evaluation by independent 
judges and informally – though perhaps more effectively – through the hurdles of the litigation 
process.  Justifications that are not falsified will be accepted and adopted by other courts, leading 
to a rapid dissemination of the welfare-maximizing rule. 
 
The testing and retesting of empirical reasonableness propositions in the common law occurs 
both horizontally – that is, among other courts of the same hierarchical status – and vertically – 
that is, among appellate courts of superior status.  Extremely biased policy preferences held by a 
minority of judges will tend to be cancelled out, at the horizontal level, and the average set of 
policy preferences will prevail.17  Similarly, the appellate process presents the same opportunity 
for judges to reconsider empirically false assessments of reasonableness, guided by the 
information revealed by the opposing parties.18  The cost of appeal screens out some litigants 
who have benefited from an empirically false assessment of relative costs and benefits.  The 
appeals process forces Roe to post a bond, in effect, to support his assertion that his valuation of 
                                                          
13 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
14 Keith N. Hylton, Information, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 33 
(2006) (private information on facts improves common law); Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution 
of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007) (private policy preferences of judges improve common law over 
time). 
15 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-70. 
16 I do not mean to suggest that the court would deliberately assert a false statement.  It is sufficient for this 
argument that judges have different policy preferences, and those policy preferences lead them to make different 
judgments on comparative utilities, see Gennaioli and Shleifer, supra note 14. 
17 Gennaioli and Shleifer, supra note 14. 
18 Hylton, supra note 14. 
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the old oak tree exceeds Doe’s.  But if Roe does not really care about the tree, he is unlikely to 
accept the burden of appeal.  
 
The rule of reason, which has generated specific utilitarian balancing tests in the common law, 
operates as a type of core code, or metarule, that facilitates the killing off of inefficient rules and 
rapid dissemination of efficient rules.  Because of the discretionary, utilitarian balancing in the 
common law, calibrated in every application by the private information revealed by litigants, 
welfare-maximizing rules emerge at a faster rate than would be observed if courts decided cases 
randomly and simply followed the precedent of previous courts. 
 
The core code inserted by the common law into the judicial process is a general utilitarian 
balancing test that compares discrete choices – the rule favored by the defendant with the rule 
favored by the plaintiff.  If the rule favored by the plaintiff increases the burden on the 
defendant, but results in a trivial benefit to the potential victims, or, even worse, increases the 
risks to other potential victims, then a court would find the proposed rule of the plaintiff 
unreasonable. 
 
To give just one example, consider Cooley v. Public Service Co.19  The plaintiff complained 
about a traumatic neurosis that resulted from a loud explosive noise in her telephone.  The noise 
occurred when one of the defendant power company’s cables snapped during a heavy storm, 
landed on a telephone cable running several feet beneath it, and burned through the telephone 
cable.  The plaintiff argued that the power company was guilty of negligence because it failed to 
maintain devices, where its wires crossed over telephone lines, that would have prevented the 
accident that injured her.  She proposed a wire-mesh basket that would catch the power cable 
before it landed on the telephone line.  The court found, however, that while the plaintiff’s 
proposed design reduced the risk of an accident of the sort that occurred, it increased the risk of 
electrocution to a person on the street.  The court held that an accurate assessment of reasonable 
care would require a comparison of the burden of the alternative design to the net change in 
aggregate harm resulting from the design.  Note that in Cooley, the court applied the utilitarian 
balancing test in a manner that compared the specific precaution proposed by the plaintiff to its 
expected net social benefits.  The standard “Hand Formula” analysis comparing the burden of 
precaution to the foreseeable loss was modified to take into account the foreseeable net social 
loss.  Judges and litigants understand that the reasonableness criterion gives courts flexibility to 
modify previously-adopted algorithms in order to take into account all of the relevant social costs 
and benefits. 
 
The core code of the common law allows courts to discover welfare-maximizing rules without 
first having the information required to do so.  The common law reasonableness requirement 
provides a general balancing test of which litigants are aware.  The litigants have every incentive 
to reveal information to the court that tips the balancing test in their favor.  Judges do not need be 
experts in a specific area of litigation in order for the general test to favor efficient rules.  All 
judges need to do is recognize the nature of the test, and allow its application to be determined 
by the factual content provided by the litigating parties.   
 
                                                          
19 Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940). 
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The decentralization of the common law process implies that a particular faction that wants to 
see its own welfare-reducing version of the law adopted in a majority of jurisdictions, or within a 
single jurisdiction containing several independent judges, will have to work very hard.  The 
faction may be able to persuade a minority of judges, but their work may not have an impact on 
other judges.  Moreover, the decisions of the minority of judges who were persuaded by the 
faction are continually vulnerable to challenge by opposing litigants.  In order to carry out an 
effective lobbying campaign under the common law, a faction committed to a particular 
inefficient legal rule would have to litigate continually in virtually every court.  Once a judge 
discovers that the faction’s preferred rule is inefficient, and explains why it is so in an opinion, 
other courts are likely to be influenced by the reasoning of the better informed judge. 
 
The Restatement Process 
 
The process I have just described for the common law differs from the process by which the 
Restatement is created.  Here is a simple model of the Restatement process.  A Restatement 
Reporter reads the court opinions in an area of law, say tort law.  The Reporter then tries to 
codify the rules that courts have applied, and offers interpretive guidance.  By “codify”, I mean 
that the Reporter attempts to summarize the common law in the form of codes or rules.  The 
Reporter then has his codifications approved by the ALI, which means that lawyers, judges, and 
law professors get to look over the Reporter’s codification to make sure that it is consistent with 
their readings of the law.  A persuasive codification might convince a court to change a rule that 
it had previously adopted. 
 
There are many ways in which this process differs from the common law process.  First, we 
begin with a single Reporter (or maybe more than one Reporter), who eventually reaches a final 
product.  In comparison, the common law process does not rely on a single judge, and no judge 
produces a final product.20  Every product – that is, rule – of the common law is constantly 
subject to testing by parties who have a deep investment in the dispute.  Indeed, the common law 
consists of rules, and an underlying background norm, the rule of reason, used to reexamine 
rules.  The rule of reason is sometimes crystallized in the form of particular rules, but those rules 
are required to be consistent with the general rule of reason.21  Because of this, the consideration 
of new facts might require a change in a rule, or the way that a rule is stated, so that the rule 
remains consistent with the background norm. 
 
A Restatement Reporter who is committed to an inefficient rule, or to inefficient rules in general, 
has considerable freedom to interpret common law rules with a slant toward inefficiency.  That 
slant is unlikely to be corrected by the rule development process for several reasons: there are 
relatively few litigants directly involved with a stake in the rule; there are no other Reporters, 
vertically above or horizontally in competition, who are likely to reject the proposed rules and 
                                                          
20 The U.S. Supreme Court might be suggested as a source of final rules.  See Brown v. Allen, 345 U.S. 946 (Justice 
Robert Jackson concurring) (“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.”)  Still, the Supreme Court has reversed its position on some issues, see, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (reversing a nearly 100 year old per se prohibition of resale price 
maintenance), and the filing of dissenting opinions serves largely as a signal to litigants that they may be able to get 
a reversal if they continue to litigate and the Supreme Court’s composition changes.  
21 Holmes, supra note 8, 110-115.  See also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577 (1988). 
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publish alternative rules.  Of course, there are many prominent law professionals who review 
Restatement drafts, and many who provide detailed comments.  But this type of review is 
unlikely, as a general matter, to involve the same combination of intensity and fear as one 
observes in the litigation process.  A judge who tells a Reporter than his reading of the law is 
wrong probably has little direct leverage to force the Reporter to change. 
 
Now, of course, the ALI has to approve the Reporter’s work, which constrains the Reporter’s 
freedom.  But the ALI as a body is similar to a population of voters in an election process.  The 
typical voter does not have a strong incentive to spend resources in determining the validity of 
any particular claim put to a vote.22  Indeed, if the voter believes that his vote is not pivotal, he 
has weak incentives to replicate the Reporter’s research, and can easily be bought off by any side 
of the issue.  The problem of rational apathy, apparent in most voting processes, is likely to be 
present to some degree in the ALI approval process. 
 
It is not clear that this process would be improved by having multiple Reporters rather than a 
single Reporter.  A single Reporter may worry more about permitting his individual preferences 
to control his interpretation of rules than would one of many Reporters.  A single Reporter may 
think that his reputation would suffer greatly if the whole project were deemed defective because 
of distortions caused by his biases.  One of many Reporters, on the other hand, may feel that his 
contribution is relatively small, and therefore he gains the benefits of imposing his biases, while 
externalizing the costs to the Restatement in general.  In other words, one of many Reporters 
may be like the franchisee who gets the benefits from cutting costs or from enhancing some 
related business interest, while spreading the losses in the form of reduced goodwill across the 
entire franchise network.23 
 
These arguments suggest that the checks, constraining distortions due to self-interest or 
excessive zeal, observed in the common law process are not at work in the Restatement process, 
or at least not at work with the same force.  As a result, a Reporter who is committed to a 
particular view of rules – a non-utilitarian view for example – could impress his perspective 
upon some of the rules that he codifies without running into a serious obstacle in the Restatement 
process. 
 
In addition, in comparison to the common law process, the ALI process suffers from a greater 
vulnerability to lobbying.  A member of an interest group with a particular view of the law can 
contact the ALI Reporter and attempt to persuade him.  Of course, most ALI Reporters would 
see through an attempt by openly pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff groups to have the law 
interpreted in a manner that favors them.  But the lobbying problem becomes more difficult 
when the motive of the group is unclear, or when the interest is in the nature of a commitment to 
a particular view of the law. 
 
These differences between the common law process and the ALI process may explain some of 
the instances in which the ALI process has produced rules that seem to be inconsistent with the 
                                                          
22 On the incentives of voters, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 348-350 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989);  
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper and Row, 1957). 
23 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise Contracts, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 223 (1978). 
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common law codification goal of the Restatement process.  I will discuss a few of those 
instances in the next part, confining my attention to previous Restatements. 
 
The First Restatement and the Second Restatement have both benefited from being under the 
control of the most capable Reporters one could imagine: Francis Bohlen, for the First 
Restatement, and William Prosser, for the Second Restatement.  Prosser appears to have been the 
most careful of all in his efforts to prevent personal bias and opinion from influencing the 
Restatement, but George Priest’s critique of his work on products liability suggests that Prosser 
was not entirely immune from the bias disease.24 
 
Bohlen on Consent and Mutual Combat 
 
An early example of Reporter bias having an effect on the Restatement appears in the First 
Restatement of Torts, in the rules on mutual combat.  Francis Bohlen, the Restatement Reporter, 
had to choose between two rules.  One, adopted in the majority of states, holds that consent to 
engage in mutual combat is not a defense to battery.25  The other, the minority rule, holds that 
consent to engage in mutual combat is a defense to battery, as long as the evidence indicates that 
the prevailing party did not use excessive force or act with an intention to severely injure the 
other party.26  Bohlen, having already published a paper in which he criticized the majority rule 
on mutual combat,27 adopted the minority rule as the Restatement provision on mutual combat, 
with a proviso that consent would not be recognized as a defense where the state had expressed a 
policy of preventing individuals who were unable to fully understand the nature of the risk they 
were taking on.28 
 
Setting aside Bohlen’s decision to adopt the minority rule as the Restatement provision on 
mutual combat, his reading of the law on consent in the mutual combat context is questionable.  
Hart v. Geysel indicates that the rule recognizing consent as a defense was accompanied with a 
qualification limiting its effect in the case where the evidence indicated excessive force or an 
intention to severely injure.29  Bohlen ignored this important qualification and treated mutual 
combat as indistinguishable from any other setting in which consent might be an issue.  
 
As a general matter, treating mutual combat as indistinguishable from any other setting in which 
consent is an issue introduces confusion into the law.  The common law has long treated physical 
contact under special rules when questions of consent are presented.  Consent as to the nature of 
the act and the identity of the actor generally operates as a valid assent to physical contact.30  
                                                          
24 See George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of 
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 514 (1985) (“Prosser's appendix supported his claim of an explosion in 
the law toward strict liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that what 
Prosser meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or that Prosser's discovery of a 
trend in the case law was largely his own creation.”). 
25 See, e.g., Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531 (1870); Barholt v. Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N.E. 185 (1887); 
McNeil v. Mullin, 70 Kan. 634, 79 P. 168 (1905); Royer v. Belcher, 100 W.Va. 694, 131 S.E. 556 (W.Va. 1926) 
26 Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570 (Wash. 1930). 
27 Francis Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 834-35 
(1924). 
28 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 69 (1934). 
29 See Hart, 294 P. at 572. 
30 R. v. Clarence, [1888] Q.B.D. 23 (U.K.) 
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Someone who consents to a touch, fully aware of the nature of the proposed act and the intended 
actor, in exchange for a counterfeit one hundred dollar bill, does not have a claim for battery 
against the party who inflicts the touch; he has only a claim for fraud or for contract breach.  At 
first glance, this seems hard to reconcile with the law of battery, which requires only a touch, 
motivated by an intention to inflict a potentially harmful bodily contact, to establish a prima 
facie case for liability.  Touches that occur after fraudulently induced consent would appear to be 
based on a desire to inflict a harmful bodily contact, but the law does not treat them as such.  In 
contrast to the law, Bohlen’s treatment of the consent question in the mutual combat setting 
imposes a contractual framework over the question of consent to a touch, suggesting generally 
that any fraudulent misrepresentation as to the basis for a touch might justify a claim of battery.31  
A student of the law, exposed early to Bohlen’s work, would be set on a path that would require 
correction later. 
 
The more serious and practical problem introduced by Bohlen’s Restatement provision is its 
failure to incorporate the excessive force qualification of the minority rule.  If one looks closely 
at the qualification adopted in the minority rule jurisdictions, it has the effect of severely limiting 
the force of consent as a defense or excuse.  The qualification holds, in essence, that consent is a 
defense in the mutual combat setting, except when the injuring party has gone too far.  This 
makes consent an extremely thin defense. 
  
There is a good reason for this.  If one considers the typical setting in which the party injured in 
mutual combat sues the injuring party, it is likely to be one in which the injuring party has used 
excessive force under the circumstances.  One excessive force scenario is where the injuring 
party has pushed his advantage too far, to the point of overkill.  In a case of overkill, the injuring 
party continues to punch the injured party long after he is unable to put up a fight.  Another 
excessive force scenario involves asymmetry of force, as in the case where one combatant uses a 
knife on another who uses only his fists.  The injured party, feeling that the treatment he received 
from the injuring party went well beyond the implicit terms of the agreement, would see nothing 
incongruous in suing for battery after having agreed to the fight.  A spectator, having observed 
the whole scenario, probably would not find the injured party’s decision to sue unreasonable too. 
 
On the other hand, consider the mutual fistfight where the injuring combatant gets in a good 
punch, and then steps back to let the injured combatant fall.  This is not a case of overkill or 
asymmetric force.  The reasonable participant in mutual combat would realize that he had 
received the treatment that he had contracted for.   
 
A representative sample of mutual combat cases, in Table 1, shows that the cases in which 
defendants are held liable, whether under the majority or the minority rule, contain evidence of 
excessive force.  Probably the least clear of the sample cases on that score is McNeil v. Mullin,32 
because the court provides little detail on the exchange of blows.  But the court’s references to 
the defendant’s commission of a mayhem suggest that the defendant used excessive force.  
Mayhem, a common law crime and trespass, is the intentional cutting off or destroying a member 
of the victim’s body, such as a hand or finger, so that the victim is left unable or less able to 
                                                          
31 Indeed, Bohlen’s article criticizing the majority rule on mutual combat begins by setting out a general contractual 
approach to consent questions in tort law, see Bohlen, supra note 26, at 819. 
32 McNeil v. Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Ky. 1905). 
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defend himself in battle.33  Although the details of the encounter described in McNeil cover 
mainly the exchange of insults leading up to the fight, rather than the fight itself, it is hard to see 
how an ordinary fistfight could result in the commission of a mayhem in the absence of the use 
of excessive force.  The precise type of mayhem inflicted on the plaintiff is not described in the 
opinion, but the least injurious that one could imagine – say, biting off a finger – would easily 
qualify as excessive force under the circumstances. 
 
The sample cases also suggest that a finding of excessive force is necessary for liability in the 
minority rule cases.  The key difference between the majority and minority rule cases appears to 
be that if the evidence of excessive force is unclear, then there generally will be no liability under 
the minority rule.  The majority rule, in contrast, does not require evidence of excessive force in 
order to hold a combatant liable, but moderates (or mitigates) damages according to the 
reciprocal nature of the exchange.34  In terms of the incentives to file suit, or to engage in 
combat, the minority and majority rules may be roughly equivalent.  Under the minority rule, a 
combatant who lost a fair fight would be unlikely to receive a damage award in a tort suit against 
his opponent.  Under the majority rule, a combatant who lost a fair fight would be eligible to 
receive a damage award, but the court would have discretion under the applicable law to reduce 
the award to a negligible level. 
 
If the excessive force scenarios just described explain, as I suspect they do, the vast majority of 
cases in which individuals injured in mutual combat sue their opponents, then the qualification 
attached to the minority rule swallows the consent portion of the rule, as a practical matter.  
There would be few cases in which a willing prizefight participate brought suit and was awarded 
substantial damages against an opponent who had obtained a victory by fair means and who did 
not use excessive force.  The circumstances most likely to give rise to a battery lawsuit would be 
those in which the consent defense is precluded by the qualification. 
 
Indeed the law on mutual combat appears to have followed a rather simple set of utilitarian 
principles: as the danger of the type of mutual combat increases, the scope of prohibition 
expands, and the extent to which consent serves as a defense to battery narrows.  The most 
dangerous types of mutual combat, with deadly weapons, were prohibited and consent to engage 
in such contests would not serve as a defense.35  Dueling with guns or swords, for example, was 
illegal and consent to such dueling would not serve as a defense in a lawsuit brought by an 
                                                          
33 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121. 
34 See Littledike v. Wood, 255 P. 172, 174 (Utah 1927) (“The claim made is that who committed the first act of 
violence was material in mitigation of damages.  The fact that the parties mutually engaged in a combat, though with 
anger, may be relied upon and considered in mitigation of damages; but in such case who struck the first blow, or 
committed the first act of violence, is in and of itself of no controlling nor important factor of the question, for in 
such a mutual combat both parties are aggressors and voluntary combatants.  The court well could have charged the 
jury that in case of mutual combat such fact properly could and should be considered in mitigation of damages, 
except where an injury of a serious character was maliciously inflicted by excessive and unreasonable force, or in a 
vicious or brutal manner. We think no error was committed in the particular as claimed.”); Adams v. Waggoner, 5 
Am.Rep. 230, 231 (Ind. 1870); Barholt v. Wright, 12 N.E. 185, 188 (Ohio St. 1887); Royer v. Belcher, 131 S.E. 
556, 556-557 (W.Va. 1926). 
35 See Hart, 294 P. at 573 (Holcomb, J. dissenting) (“Had it been a duel, it would have been unlawful and consent to 
fight a duel would not prevent recovery by either those injured, on the ground of excessive force, or the heirs or 
personal representatives of those injured.”). 
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injured party.36  Perhaps a sufficient reason for prohibiting such duels is that they put innocent 
third parties at risk of injury or death.  The next level down from dueling is boxing.  Boxing can 
be as deadly as dueling.  On the other hand, boxing with padded gloves is likely to be less 
dangerous, depending on how the conduct is carried out.37  Given the variation in the level of 
danger associated with boxing, to participants and to third parties, the degree to which consent 
could serve as a defense should vary according to the specific danger level of the particular 
contest.  The minority rule, as originally stated in the law, not as described by Bohlen, appears to 
be consistent with this utilitarian intuition. 
 
Of course, once we consider the administrative costs of distinguishing battery cases resulting 
from mutual combat based on the degree of danger under the circumstances, we can see 
immediately why the majority rule is attractive.  It offers a simple, straightforward statement of 
the law that results in pretty much the same outcome as would be observed under the more fine-
grained minority rule.  When administrative costs and risks of error are taken into account, the 
majority rule is probably preferable on utilitarian grounds to the minority rule, even though the 
minority rule does a better job of tracking the regulatory dictates of the utilitarian. 
 
In any event, Bohlen appears to have given little consideration to these issues, and fashioned a 
Restatement rule on mutual combat that is not reflected in either the majority or minority rules of 
the common law.  Bohlen’s new rule was approved by the ALI and is part of the First 
Restatement of Torts.38 
 
Bohlen’s work on mutual combat serves as an example of the sort of bias that can distort the 
Restatement process in a way that is not observed in the common law process.  The consent rule 
fashioned by Bohlen is disconnected to some of the fundamental rules and policies reflected in 
the common law on mutual combat.  It reflects Bohlen’s vision of how the law should look, not 
what the law provided.  If it were a rule generated by a particular judge, it probably would not 
have survived the testing (and retesting) process of the common law. 
 
Bohlen’s rule may seem to be welfare-maximizing on the simple basis that it allows for freedom 
of contract: if people want to engage in mutual combat, let them do so, and let them take the 
injuries that come with it, without shifting the losses to others.  But this simple version of 
freedom of contract misses important features of the mutual combat problem that were reflected 
in the law. 
 
The most important features that Bohlen’s rule misses are the risk of escalation and the 
substantial risk to third parties.  The rules on mutual combat were developed over a period in 
which men dueled openly in public streets with guns or swords.  A verbal slight might require a 
man to save face through an invitation to a deadly contest.39  Whatever its advantages in 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Even the use of boxing gloves cannot prevent long term injury from sustaining repeated concussions – and may 
increase the risk of such injuries. See, e.g., Antoinette Vacca, Boxing: Why It Should Be Down Count, 103 SPORTS. 
L. J. 207 (2006). 
38 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 61 (1934). 
39 See Christopher Kingston & Robert Wright, The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling, 76 S. ECON. J. 
1094, 1095 (2010). 
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regulating aggressive conduct,40 mutual combat, especially with deadly weapons, imposes risks 
of unanticipated escalation and serious injury to third parties.  Because of this, mutual combat is 
not simply a matter of allocating risks and rewards within a contract between two combatants.  
The welfare-maximizing rule on mutual combat would impose a prohibition, first, and then 
examine possible exceptions based on the level of danger to society. 
 
The common law appears to have adopted this approach.  The states that adopted the majority 
rule drew a distinction between mutual combat that threatened public order and mutual combat 
that did not.41  The majority rule denying consent any force as a defense applied only to the 
former.42  This is consistent with a utilitarian framework that takes into account risks of 
escalation and of harm to third parties. 
                                                          
40 Warren F. Schwartz, et al., The Duel: Can these Gentlemen be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984) 
(offering an efficiency theory of dueling). 
41 Teeters v. Frost, 292 P. 356, 359-360 (1930). 
42 Id. 
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   TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MUTUAL COMBAT CASES 
 
Case Name          Rule Used            Excessive Force?             Fact Summary                   Liability? 
Adams v. 
Waggoner 
33 Ind. 531 
(1870) 
Majority Some evidence of 
overkill, but court 
does not go into 
detail. 
The two men engaged in a 
mutual fight, but the defendant 
brought out a knife and 
severely wounded the plaintiff. 
Yes 
Barholt v. 
Wright 
45 Ohio St. 177 
(1887) 
Majority Yes, the court 
called the excess 
“mayhem.” 
The parties consented to fight 
one another, but the defendant 
bit off the plaintiff’s finger. 
Yes 
McNeil v. 
Mullin 
70 Kan. 634 
(1905) 
Majority Yes, opinion notes 
that defendant 
committed a 
mayhem. 
A series of insulting comments 
back in forth resulted in both 
men getting off their buggies, 
taking off their hat and coat, 
and having a fist fight. 
Yes 
Royer v. 
Belcher 
100 W.Va. 694 
(1926) 
Majority Some evidence of 
overkill, in light of 
the plaintiff’s 
inability to 
respond with equal 
force. 
Defendant was informed by his 
wife of an insulting remark 
made by the plaintiff. D went 
to P’s house where a fight 
broke out. D repeatedly 
punched P resulting in P losing 
his glasses and physical 
injuries requiring a doctor. 
Yes 
Littledike v. 
Wood 
69 Utah 323 
(1927) 
Majority Yes, defendant 
kicked plaintiff in 
the ribs, after he 
was almost 
unconscious. 
After a dispute over hay bales, 
the parties engaged in a fight. 
Respondent was kicked in the 
ribs causing a punctured lung, 
lost some teeth, and his face 
was cut and bruised. 
Yes 
White v. 
Whittall 
113 Mich. 493 
(1897) 
Minority Short opinion, 
court views the 
offensive contact 
as mutual. 
 
Parties began a fight in the 
middle of the highway, using 
offensive language in front of 
their children. Both were 
equally “eager for the fray.” 
No 
Smith v. Simon 
69 Mich. 481 
(1888) 
Minority No excessive 
cruelty or 
unnecessary 
beating or 
harshness. 
Defendant broke plaintiff’s 
arm and dislocated his 
shoulder. They agreed 
mutually to fight “in fun.” The 
parties were wrestling. 
 
 
No 
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Lykins v. 
Hamrick 
144 Ky. 80 
(1911) 
Minority No, both used 
knives, and when 
they separated, 
both were injured 
but neither too 
severely. 
Parties were neighbors and 
friends for a long time. They 
fought with knives in the front 
yard after one made offensive 
remarks towards the other. 
This was following a dispute 
about the children of each 
dating each other. 
No 
Colby v. 
McClendon 
85 Okl. 293 
(1922) 
Majority Although there 
was no overkill, it 
was with deadly 
weapons so 
majority rule 
applies. 
Gun fight ensued after a 
dispute over a land 
conveyance. This resulted in 
the death of the decedent and 
another party. 
Yes 
Milam v. Milam 
46 Wash. 468 
(1907) 
Probably 
Minority 
Yes, the biting of 
the knuckle was 
“cruel and 
unjustifiable.” 
Parties got into a dispute after 
one accused the other of telling 
lies in court. It resulted in a 
struggle and a fist fight. 
Plaintiff’s knuckle was bitten 
off and finger was broken. 
Yes 
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Prosser 
 
According to Priest’s famous critique of Prosser’s work on Restatement 402A on products 
liability, Prosser persuaded the ALI to adopt the strict products liability theory set out in 402A on 
the basis of a small set of cases that provided weak support at best for Prosser’s theory.43  If this 
is true, then it serves as another example of the Restatement process failing to accurately reflect 
the development of the common law.  Put another way, it may be another example in which the 
preferences of a Restatement Reporter have distorted the common law in a manner that probably 
could not have occurred if the Reporter had been just the author of a judicial opinion.44   
 
Priest’s critique is easily discounted today, given that the law has advanced well beyond 
Prosser’s formulation of 402A.  Courts have generated a risk-utility analysis that effectively 
incorporates the structure of negligence doctrine.  With products liability law now sharing its 
most important features with traditional negligence analysis, there is little reason to worry about 
the common law on products liability retaining significant distortions attributable to the 
Restatement 402A.   
 
Still, in spite of the successful integration of negligence principles in products liability law, the 
common law on products liability remains in a confusing state and commentators have struggled 
to find the consistent patterns in the case law.  Henderson and Twerski, as Restatement Reporters 
on products liability, have advanced our understanding greatly by providing a consistent 
doctrinal framework for the confusingly-stated and balkanized case law.45 
 
I suspect that the law on products liability would have developed in a clearer fashion without the 
distortion initially provided by Restatement 402A.  The courts have evolved toward a structure 
that has been available for hundreds of years.  The process of evolution has required some courts 
to stumble over the language of the Restatement until eventually working their way toward a 
clear theory of products liability law grounded in negligence doctrine.  
 
Modern design defect litigation has adopted what is essentially a negligence test for designs; the 
risk-utility test.  The test could have easily developed from the common law process without the 
injection of the strict liability concept in Restatement 402A.  Indeed, the case of the electric 
power lines discussed earlier, Cooley, is an early example of a court applying a risk-utility test to 
a negligence claimed based on the design of a power delivery system.46  The basic theories of 
                                                          
43 George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 514 (1985) (“Prosser's appendix supported his claim of an explosion in the law 
toward strict liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that what Prosser 
meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or that Prosser's discovery of a trend in 
the case law was largely his own creation.”). 
44 I must distinguish my critique of Prosser from a recent article that suggests that Prosser fell under the influence of 
tobacco lawyers.  See Elizabeth Laposata, Richard L. Barnes, and Stanton Arnold Glantz, Tobacco Industry 
Influence on the American Law Institute's Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012).  That Prosser was lobbied by tobacco lawyers does not point unavoidably to the 
conclusion that he was excessively influenced by their views.  I remain confident of Prosser’s independence from 
special-interest groups and hold his work in the highest regard. 
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) (James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, 
Reporters). 
46 See Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940). 
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modern products liability law have been in the courts for hundreds of years.  The current 
consensus on the legal standard would have developed just as quickly, and I believe even more 
quickly, without the Restatement. 
 
Third Restatement 
 
The Third Restatement has been in the hands of many capable Reporters.  Unlike the First and 
Second Restatements, the Third Restatement does not appear to be developing under the control 
of one torts scholar.  Having said this, some Reporters have had a bigger impact on the 
Restatement Third project than others because of the scope of the pieces they controlled.  My 
late dear friend Gary Schwartz incorporated noticeable changes in the Third Restatement of 
Torts (Third), Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.47 
 
Gary Schwartz was effectively the dean of torts scholars in America before his untimely death.  
For many years, tort scholarship has been divided into utilitarian and corrective justice camps – a 
division that crystallized as the sophistication of scholarship advanced.  Gary Schwartz was the 
rare example of a scholar whose advice was accepted willingly by scholars in both camps.  He 
steadfastly maintained a position of detachment from either camp, and discussed their respective 
arguments from an independent point of view.  A good law school dean is both an intellectual 
leader and a force for reconciliation among opposing factions on a faculty; Gary Schwartz filled 
this role for torts scholars.  His absence has been and remains a serious loss for torts scholarship. 
 
But being open-minded and willing to listen to all perspectives did not prevent Schwartz from 
picking and choosing among arguments.  Indeed, Schwartz was aggressive in imposing his views 
on the Restatement Third.  Two areas in which Schwartz incorporated drastic changes in the 
Restatement are the law on duty and the law of strict liability. 
 
Schwartz on Duty  
 
In his capacity as Restatement Reporter, Schwartz treated duty as essentially a “wild card” 
doctrine in tort law that courts resort to when they find special policy or pragmatic reasons that a 
defendant should not be held liable even though a straightforward examination of the breach and 
causation issues would point toward liability.48  In other words, duty doctrine was an empty 
vessel into which courts poured their case-specific policy views whenever those views required a 
deviation from the standard application of negligence law. 
 
This was not a new argument.  Prosser had described duty doctrine in the same terms in his 
hornbook.  The difference, however, is that Prosser confined his views on the function of duty 
doctrine to his hornbook and did not attempt to incorporate them into the Restatement Second.49  
                                                          
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM (2011). 
48 Id. § 7 cmt. a (“[I]n some categories of cases, reasons of principle or policy dictate that liability should not be 
imposed. In these cases, courts use the rubric of duty to apply general categorical rules withholding liability.”). 
49 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence 
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 674 (2001) (“It would not be surprising to learn that Prosser was attracted to the 
formulation of Section 281 in part because it avoided talk of duty. However, Prosser kept some distance between his 
academic critique of the concept of duty in law review articles, and his active deployment of that concept in a 
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Indeed, Prosser’s Restatement Second is respectful of the traditional four-part analysis of 
negligence consisting of duty, breach, causation, and damages.  Schwartz updated the 
Restatement portion on negligence to relegate the duty component to a secondary role. 
 
I agree broadly with both Prosser and Schwartz on the necessarily ad hoc and pragmatic function 
of duty doctrine in negligence law – and like them, I believe it plays a secondary role.  Unlike 
Schwartz – and to some extent unlike Prosser too – I have attempted to explain in utilitarian 
terms the precise functions duty doctrines play in tort law.50  Duty is not an empty vessel used to 
hold the momentary pragmatic concerns that a particular case may generate.  Duty doctrine 
shows consistent patterns and performs identifiable functions in tort law.51 
 
As between Prosser and Schwartz, I favor the approach that Prosser took.  Prosser recognized the 
policy bases for duty doctrine, though he never attempted to set out a general theory on the 
subject.  He saw that there was sufficient substance to respect the role of duty doctrine in 
negligence law, and for that reason did not attempt to minimize its importance in the Restatement 
Second.   
 
Schwartz, in contrast, had little patience for mystical and tradition-based arguments.  Schwartz 
was aware of the policy conjectures that Prosser had set out, but Prosser’s account fell short of 
providing a rigorous functional theory of duty doctrine.  At the time that Schwartz approached 
the subject, there was no functional account of duty doctrine.  And although Schwartz listened to 
all perspectives with respect, he could be counted on to reject a non-rigorous, purely tradition-
based argument.  Seeing no rigorous argument for giving duty doctrine an important status in the 
structure of negligence law, Schwartz relegated it to a secondary position. 
 
To give just one example of what a richer account of duty doctrine would entail, consider the law 
governing the duty of self-care in the course of a rescue attempt.  Eckert v. Long Island 
Railroad52 holds that a person who is injured by the defendant in the course of an attempt to 
rescue a third party will be found guilty of contributory negligence only if his conduct is 
reckless.53  In terms of duty analysis, Eckert relieves the rescuer of a duty of ordinary care with 
respect to his own safety; he breaches the duty of care only by engaging in reckless conduct.54  
What is the function of this relief?  The relief serves, in effect, as a subsidy to rescuers.  The law 
on rescue shows reluctance to punish individuals for failing to rescue, while at the same time it 
provides liability relief those who attempt to rescue – to use Saul Levmore’s analogy, a policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Restatement or treatise. . . . Prosser continued to rely on the traditional four-part formula through several editions of 
his treatise and casebook.”). 
50 Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501 (2006). 
51 Id. at 1501-02 (summarizing the functions of duty law: to subsidize desirable activities by removing the threat of 
liability, to support property rights, and to prevent liability risk from distorting markets).   
52 Eckert v. Long Island Railroad, 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871). 
53 Id. (“The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, 
unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. For a person 
engaged in his ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection of property, knowingly and voluntarily to place himself in a 
position where he is liable to receive a serious injury, is negligence, which will preclude a recovery for an injury so 
received; but when the exposure is for the purpose of saving life, it is not wrongful, and therefore not negligent 
unless such as to be regarded either rash or reckless.”). 
54 Id. 
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leaning toward carrots and away from sticks.55  Such a view of the law governing rescue 
provides a set of policies that a Restatement Reporter could use in examining details on the case 
law on rescue.   A richer understanding of duty doctrine provides not just a one-off explanation 
for a particular case, but a basis for reconsidering a set of doctrines associated with a recurrent 
scenario. 
 
Schwartz on Strict Liability 
 
The other major change in the Third Restatement imposed by Schwartz is the provision on strict 
liability for hazardous activities.  Schwartz replaced the Second Restatement’s six part test for 
strict liability with a simpler two part test.56 
 
The Second Restatement, under Prosser’s guidance, had produced a six part test for strict 
liability, Section 520, which lists six factors: (1) the risk of harm is great, (2) the harm that would 
occur is great, (3) the harm cannot be prevented by reasonable care, (4) the activity is not one of 
common usage, (5) the activity is inappropriate for its location, and (6) the social value of the 
activity is not sufficient to offset the risks. 
 
The Third Restatement replaces the six factor test with a two-factor test that collapses the first 
three parts of Section 520 into one question – whether the residual risk of harm is great when the 
defendant takes care – and eliminates the last two factors.  The comments to the Restatement 
soften the impact of these changes by reintroducing “benefit to the plaintiff” as a factor to be 
considered in analyzing strict liability. 
 
The different formulations of the strict liability test in the Second and Third Restatements are 
capable of being interpreted so that they are consistent with one another and point to the same 
conclusion in any particular case.  One could argue, for example, that the commonality inquiry 
incorporates the “appropriateness” and “value” inquiries of the last two parts of Restatement 
Second Section 520.  But if one chooses not to read the tests so that they are equivalent, then one 
is left with the claim that commonality does all of the work that used to be accomplished by the 
last two factors of Section 520.   
 
This is a doubtful claim.  Commonality is an empirical question that is easy to answer in extreme 
cases but otherwise difficult.  Was the storage of water, to be used a source of power for a 
production facility, common at the time of Rylands v. Fletcher?57  I suspect the answer is yes, 
though I am also inclined to believe that this is a matter of opinion.  Certainly the storage of 
water for the purpose of powering mills was not a rare phenomenon in the middle 1800s.58   
 
                                                          
55 Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative 
Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-94 (1986). 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20(b) (2011) (“An activity is 
abnormally dangerous if: (1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even 
when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.”). 
57 Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (U.K.) (Blackburn, J.). 
58 A. W. B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 209, 216, 242 (1984). 
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How does one determine if an activity is sufficiently common to merit an exemption from strict 
liability?  The obvious question that follows any attempt to determine whether something is 
common is to ask “common relative to what”?  The commonality test of the Third Restatement 
sounds deceptively simple, but it raises more questions than it answers.  I am not sure that the 
commonality test, by itself, would support the court’s conclusion in Rylands v. Fletcher, which is 
a deeply troubling turn of affairs.  The Restatement project, which has admirably attempted to 
codify the doctrine of strict liability, has at length found its way to a rule that appears to be 
incompatible with the framework of Rylands v. Fletcher. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The foregoing examples are cases in which the individual preferences of Restatement Reporters 
have led them to interpret and describe the law in a way that is not consistent with the common 
law at the time of their reports.  What explains these excesses?  I think it largely comes down to 
the checks and balances inherent in the common law process and their absence in the 
Restatement process. 
 
Everyone comes to work with their preferences, including judges.  Rational individuals will 
always act to satisfy their preferences, within the constraints that are set before them.  Duty can 
be defined generally as acting against the satisfaction of one’s own preferences in order to carry 
out the requirements of some position or station in society.  The law provides a set of constraints 
that restrict the freedom of individuals to act exclusively in a manner that satisfies their own 
preferences.  The relatively few individuals who are motivated by an internal sense of duty have 
little need for the law’s constraints.  But just as the law constrains individuals in their 
interactions with others, the common law process constrains judges from operating according to 
their own preferences at all times. 
 
An individual judge writes with a keen awareness that his arguments will be reviewed by later 
courts, which by itself constrains the tendency to substitute one’s own interpretive preferences 
for an objective rendering of the law and its associated policies.  The review process permits 
well-reasoned arguments to have a continuing impact on the law, while the poorly-reasoned 
arguments are discarded.  The reasonableness standard in the common law of torts provides a 
utilitarian metarule to guide courts in making decisions.  Thus, judges are constrained by their 
perceptions of the likelihood of review, constrained in fact by a survivorship bias in the common 
law (only the best-reasoned arguments survive the process of review by other courts), and 
constrained by an overarching utilitarian framework for policy. 
 
These constraints are not part of the Restatement process.  An individual Reporter can find 
latitude, even if only interstitially, to substitute his own preferences, or those of a lobbying agent, 
for an objective description of the law and its policies.  Once these preferences become 
embedded in a Restatement provision, they can have a distortive effect on the development of the 
common law.  Instead of unifying the common law, as Cardozo thought would happen, the 
Restatement can create inconsistencies and distortions, in law and in policy, which courts will 
have to work out over time. 
 
 
